Date: Tue Jun 8 05:55:22 2004
Sender: Stephen Thompson
Andy, you mentioned something in the Air Combat thread that I think deserves
consideration in its own thread. To what extent will entirely unusual
strategies be possible in the game?
The example you mentioned was Germany actually bombing New York. Obviously
there are some challenges for that, since Germany didn't have aircraft
carriers, but the point remains.
Another example, in 1940 Britain had a full scale invasion of Norway actually
underway which was cancelled only because of the Ruso-Finnish peace treaty.
After the cease-fire in Finland, Britain called back the troops because they
thought it would unite Scandanavia against the UK.
So the real question here is how much of this kind of stuff will be possible,
and what would be the corrolary effects, like causing Finland and Sweeden to
declare war on Britain?
Date: Tue Jun 8 12:09:07 2004
Sender: Klaus Von Meyerinck
I would like to expend the question in several ways:
Will Axis Tide be a simulation that sticks as close as possible to the WW II
events or will players have the freedom to rewrite history?
For example: Let's assume I would choose Germany for a game. When I remember it
right, we will have scenarios prior to 1939 and it's almost fixed alliances. If
so, will I find myself in close bounds, not allowing me to act a bit more sane
than Hitler, so ending up necessarily fighting a war on two frontiers?
Or will I have the opportunity to change history significantly, say: Negotiate
an alliance with Russia (assuming I'm not dreaming of conquering space in the
east) and keeping it up for some 8, 10 years, thus having my back covered and
try to defeat France, clean up the mediterranean first and than try to invade
Great Britain (or whatever: keep peace with GB or fight Russia with GB as an
allied power and so on and so on)?
And one more thing: Have you thought about how to balance out the powers? In
other words: Will there be a realistic chance for the Axis to win the thing?
Date: Tue Jun 8 13:06:41 2004
Sender: Andy Dolphin
The general answer is that there will be some degree of flexibility, but not
too much.
In terms of overall politics, I don't see how Hitler's long-stated goal of
conquest of Russia could possibly have resulted in something other than war
between Germany and Russia. Likewise the public opinion in the democracies was
very much opposed to conquest as foreign policy, and would have led to war with
the Axis powers sooner or later.
The details, of course, can be fairly sophisticated. Various non-aggression
pacts and guarantees were made, none worth the paper they were written on in
the long run but affording temporary relief. The US entry was slow, and can be
altered by world events. The question of relations with minor countries is
probably more open for discussion.
Regarding research, Hitler's plans for bombing the US were for using long-range
bombers based in the Azores. Of course, they were never allowed to occupy the
Azores, and never developed long-range bombers. We'll decide at a later time
whether or not Germany should be allowed to direct its R&D elsewhere.
Honestly, though, their R&D was pretty optimal, tanks and ground support, so
while a massive B29 development campaign might be fun it would be done at the
expense of Stukas and the war would be over in 1941 when French troops march
into Berlin. But sure, some flexibility will be nice, and we'll talk about
that later.
I don't think the Axis should be able to win, barring inept play by the Allies.
A lot of books stress "how Hitler could have won", neglecting the fact that
the Allies repeatedly showed an ability to do what they had to do (except for
the French, who went in expecting to lose). For example, the fact that the
British didn't have more tanks in Egypt was a reflection on the fact they
didn't need more, not necessarily a sign that a more aggressive German strategy
would have won.
Date: Tue Jun 8 14:34:28 2004
Sender: Stephen Thompson
Don't take this the wrong way - it's an honest question. If the Axis cannot
win, what will be the point of the game?
A different question - Roosevelt was elected in 1938 on a campaign of
non-intervention in foreign wars. If Japan does not attack Hawaii, what will
cause US involvement?
Date: Tue Jun 8 16:02:18 2004
Sender: Klaus Von Meyerinck
I think, Stephen has a point here. Let's not talk about nuclear weapons for a
minute since their introduction would end the game anyway.
I am not sure, whether a game will attract many players when the outcome is
obvious and in the end I'll have to loose as axis player and will win as allied
player. There must be more to it.
I'm not saying that Germany should be able to defeat GB and the US and Russia
since this (thank god) was out of the question in the long run.
However there must be some outcome other than total german defeat (and I am not
arguing here as a german, just as a potential player). If you go along historic
guidelines it's obvious that Germany won't make allies with GB and France, it's
even more obvious, that the war against Russia will come - be it 41 or 42 or 43
- under any circumstances.
Nevertheless I think there should be a way involved that f.e. the Germans have
a chance to reach a "draw peace" (german literature uses "Remis-Frieden")
against Russia, keeping some territory under their control (probably the
Ukraine). A scenario btw that was not out of the question for a long time
during the eastern campaign. That of course would free more than half of german
military power to fight in the west... Other issues where the game should give
the possibility of developing its own story could be: Germany not declaring war
on the US (which they hadn't to do following the guidelines of their pact with
Japan), Spain entering the war as an Axis power, Italy being well played and
not as totally inept as they were in 41, thus avoiding german engagement in
Africa and weakening the British, Germany winning the Battle of Britain (which
they came much closer to than most of the british literature is
admitting)etc...
I'm not saying that this should become a fantasy game, I agree one should stick
to most basic historic lines. But I think the game would loose a lot if you
limit it to relive the campaigns. There should be some potential of playing to
a different outcome and/or having slightly modificated alliances. It shouldn't
be too easy for other than allied forces to win, but I'm convinced any WW II
strategy game needs the challenge of leading either side to victory. Most games
do that, if Axis Tide would open a militarical and a political way it could be
one of its strong points.
One last point: Maybe the solution can be to put two slightly different games
in one? A more historic game which lets players basically only act along
historic developments and a more free version, where players can build
alliances and declare war or negotiate peace at will. Everything in terms of
game mechanics would be the same, just some guidelines would be in place or
not. I would be like trading in a DEL league under the current rules or be able
to trade waiver-signed players and next three first rounders right away. Puh,
bad example, but I hope one get's the point...
Date: Tue Jun 8 19:17:52 2004
Sender: Andy Dolphin
OK, let's take a look at the Pacific for a minute, since my situation (as game
designer) is more obvious. Japan had zero chance whatsoever that it could
possibly win the war. Consider the production numbers for Japan vs. the US
alone, ignoring China, England, and British Commonwealth/Colonies:
USA Japan
Carriers 141 17
Battleships 10 2
Cruisers 48 9
Destroyers 498 63
Shipping 33993 4152 (in 1000s of tons)
Aircraft 324750 76320
Not even close. Sure, much of the US air production was used in Europe, but
most of its naval production went to the Pacific. To put this into
perspective, even had the US lost its entire fleet at Midway (rather than
winning huge victory), the US would have had the largest fleet in the world
within 9 months!
So sure, it's theoretically plausible for the US to "lose" in the Pacific, but
it would require some really incompetent play.
Given that, do we gut the simulation aspect of the game to the extent that it's
complete fantasy, or do we redefine "win" and "lose"? I favor the latter. For
Japan to "win", it's not necessary to have its troops marching through Siberia,
India, Australia, and San Francisco. Rather, the Japanese player has to do
better than how an average player would do.
Obviously Germany's economic picture isn't as obviously bleak, as it was only
outproduced 3:1 by the US, rather than 12:1 (in the case of Japan). Putting it
all together, the Axis had 20% of the world's "warmaking potential" in 1940,
while the US alone had 42%. Given that, in the end, a game between
evenly-matched players will be won by the side with the greater industrial
capacity, this means that Axis Tide would have to be balanced so that the
"average" game sees the Axis:
1. occupy France, England, Russia past the Urals
2. get the rest of Russia to sue for peace and remain neutral
3. manage to do all this without bombing any factories (so as to keep them at
100% production)
4. incur no occupation costs (material spent fighting resistance as well as
production lost to sabotage).
If any of these criteria aren't met, the US would be able to outproduce the
entire Axis and its conquests.
Is this how we want the average game to work out? I don't. So again we're
left with the choice of artificially screwing with the sim system or defining
"victory" such that the Axis will "win" half the time and lose half the time
among equal opponents.
Obviously the fundamental "problem" is the US. By 1945, the US accounted for
half of the economic output of the entire world. Granted that part of this is
because Germany and Japan were being bombed, but still it indicates that, for
Axis Tide to be realistic, the US has to be an industrial superpower whose
mobilization dooms the Axis. The main question is how far the Axis can get
before this happens, and how long they can hold out once it does. If the Axis
player somehow manages to conquer the world, then obviously he is given credit
for a huge victory.
Again, I agree that some flexibility adds interest to the game. Mostly in that
small countries could have acted differently, R&D efforts could have come out
differently, and so on.
I know Stalin sent out peace feelers to Germany. The fact that he did so in
1943, and did so in a way that he was guaranteed to be "caught" by the British,
indicates that this was a not-so-subtle nudge to invade Italy and France and
not a serious peace effort.
Likewise, the 'battle of britain' facts Klaus claims are pretty far off. In
1940, Britain averaged 1250 aircraft produced per month; Germany averaged 900.
During the Battle of Britain, British pilots shot down two Germans for every
British plane shot down or bombed. In addition, about 1/2 of British airmen
shot landed in England and were healthy enough to fly again; virtually all
German survivors landed in England and were captured. So Britain was
outproducing Germany by about 40%, winning the "aircraft loss" battle by a
margin of 2:1, and winning the "pilot loss" battle by a margin of about 4:1.
Perhaps Klaus is right that there should be optional rules. But let's get the
"plain" one designed before we decide what (if any) such rules are needed to
spice it up.
Back to the original question, I should repeat that I don't want Axis Tide to
completely force all historical, diplomatic, and R&D results (though completely
historical options would make another potentially-interesting 'optional rule').
Things that make the game more interesting without causing the entire game to
rest on a single die roll would be positive. Such things include minor degrees
of variety in foreign relations, faster or slower research efforts, and so on.
Date: Wed Jun 9 05:46:58 2004
Sender: Stephen Thompson
Andy, since you say the big challenge for the Axis will be avoiding US
involvement in the war, what about my other question? Although there are
plenty of conspiracy theories to the contrary, there was a strong isolationist
movement in the country, led by President Roosevelt.
Were we sending pilots and munitions to Britain? Sure. Did we set ourselves
up in open conflict with Japan by setting up oil and steel embargos?
Obviously. But what if Japan had been able to negotiate peace with America
during the negotiations in late November 1941? Will that be a possible
outcome?
Part of me wonders if Pearl Harbor has to be a fixed event in Axis Tide. I
think that is perhaps the pivotal design decision for the game.
Date: Wed Jun 9 08:56:08 2004
Sender: Nathan Dilday
This is a bit of a tangent, but isn't examinging only the industrial output of
a country to measure it's warmaking capacity a bit of an oversimplification? It
doesn't take into account available manpower (since a different subset of
people could work factories that couldn't be allowed into the military), or
popular opinion.
I'll grant that the US was pretty supreme in manpower, too, it's the effect
that popular support may have had if the US had been handed consistent defeats,
or heavy casualty victories, that I wonder about.
THere'salso a matter of getting the instruments of war to the front. The US had
incredibly long supply lines on both of its fronts. I don't know enough about
operational logistics to analyze the ramifications of that, but it seems to me
that it would lead to an ability for the Axis to concentrate their forces in
defence, which the US had to spread forces to cover a larger area.
Date: Wed Jun 9 17:04:24 2004
Sender: Klaus Von Meyerinck
Well, maybe it's not the right place to discuss the battle of britain now and
here and I'm not sure if there will be any impact on the game, but still I
can't stand put when I'm supposed to be far off. Even more so I find nothing
than some numbers thrown at me. Sure, numbers say a lot, but they do not tell
the entire story and certainly those numbers need a second and third look what
I will try to do.
(By the way: I still doubt the description of german blitzkrieg-tactics given
in the other thread and can't find any evidence in any german literature for
that. But I think this topic is finished anyway and no one wants to bring it
up, not even me, but I just had to say... :-)).
But now some remarks to the Battle of Britain and my supposedly far off
remarks: numbers are not everything and sheer numbers don't necessaryly tell
the entire story, moreover if those numbers are just a mere overlook and turn
some points upside down, like giving the impression that pilot shortage was a
german problem and not, as it was, a problem bringing the RAF close to defeat.
Maybe those very different viewpoints that Andy and me seem to have are a
result of this: Overall I have not found a second battle of WW II by air, land
or sea differing so much in allied and german approach and research as the
battle of britain - despite it's outcome which leaves no questions.
A look at plane production: yes, GB was producing more fighters than Germany,
but germans fighter production was enough to keep the jagdgeschwaders during
phase II of the BoB at 80 percent of their supposed strength on paper, thus
keeping them as effective combat unites. British production during phase II was
not enough to keep up with mounting losses. Phase II in german literature is
dated from august 24th to september 6th after a battle of attrition during the
weeks before. And this is what I was refering to in my previous post.
This phase sees Luftwaffes most concentrated attacks on vital british fighter
command airfields, command centers etc, like Biggin Hill, Debden, Hornchurch,
Croydon etc. This phase is so important since for the first and last time
during the battle the Luftwaffe followed the right strategy, the only one with
a chance for success. Numbers will prove this: RAF fighter command losses
during Phase II have been counted at 273 planes shot down and 49 losses due to
severe damage in combat, a total of 322. Luftwaffe losses stand at 308/66,
total 374. And that does include bombers. Looking at the crucial and normally
decisive fighter numbers alone we find 146 Bf 109 shot down and 27 too heavily
damaged to repair them, total of 173. British losses stand at 208/31. This
shows that despite all advantages on side of the RAF the german fighters were
well able to not only hold themselves but beat the RAF (as they did in 1942
with the RAF atacking and Luftwaffe defending).
As a result at the end of septembers first week it looked for british fighter
command as if the battle was going to be a loss. German JaFü 2 claimed
"undisputed fighter superiority over southern england", german bomber
squadrons, heavily blundered before, reported in masses about weakening british
resistance.
To fighter production: British fighter production surpassed germanys, right.
But this number alone is meaningless as is comparing them against each other.
What we have to compair is production of new fighters vs. losses on each side.
In the last week of August 1940 we see 91 Spits and Hurricanes coming from the
factorys while 137 have been shot down. After british estimates of their
swindling reserves Luftwaffe had to keep up the sort of attacks of Phase II
(again: hitting the vital sector commands and air fields of fighter command)
for 3 more weeks to bring british reserves to 0. Plans for that scenario have
already been in place on british side, resulting in 11th group pulling back to
safety north of London, thus giving the Luftwaffe what it wanted, air
superiority over southern england.
Personell: Yes, of course german pilots shot down and not being killed became
Pow's and british ones were able to return to their units and fight on.
Nevertheless the loss of pilots once again only get's meaning by comparing it
to new pilots arriving in the units (and that leaves out the lack of
experience). And those ratio hit the RAF much sharper than Luftwaffe, despite
their "home court advantage". One can find even in the brightest british
history books about the battle (that by the way sometimes tend to glorify
win-loss numbers in RAF's favor in an almost ridicoulos way) how pilot shortage
became RAF's biggest threat, not Luftwaffes despite their own problems.
Remember, RAF had lost 300 pilots over Belgium and France, lost another 154
between August 8th and 18th while getting 63 new ones during those 10 days from
the schools. Pilot losses from august 24 to september 1: 231 dead, severly
wounded or mia, that's almost 20 % of RAF's strength in a week, resulting in
british units equivalent to a german staffel having generally only 16 combat
ready pilots of a necessary 26. Losses took their toll in experience of course:
11 of 46 squadron leaders dead, 39 of 97 flight leaders kia at that point.
Young pilots seldom had 20 hours on their fighters before joining battle, as a
result f.e. 85th fighter squadron in Croydon saw 14 of its 18 pilots shot down
in 14 consecutive days during august/september.
Overall numbers:
Of course I know the numbers at the end of the BoB, counting RAF losses at 1400
and Luftwaffes at 2800. Nevertheless I do not accept the widely spread british
writing of so few shooting down so many: The only battle that should have been
decisive was fighter vs fighter and that sees german Bf109 E and its pilots
superior to Spitfire Mk I and Hurricane by a 2:1-margin. And I think this
sounds logical: Fighter superiority is the basis for bombers to operate. It's
only consequent to assume that if Germany would have gained a lasting
superiority with its fighters, losses of bombers would have dropped by far.
So why then do we face the outcome despite what i mentioned before? Because the
decisive mistakes have not been made by pilots but by the german leadership
which came to rescue of the RAF with it's fatal decision to shift the attacks
away from fighter command to London, starting september 7th. This mistake,
forced by Göring and Kesselring, turned the tide of the battle. Taking in
account that the Luftwaffe had to fight a strategic battle without any aircraft
that was suited for this task, one has to admit what tremendous skills the
german pilots showed. Bf 109 was short-ranged, thus limited to 10 minutes
fighting time over London, Bf 110 wasn't able to protect anything but itself
and even that only with a lots of luck, bombers were just medium types and
twin-engined, Stukas a failure in this conflict. The idea of a strategic german
airforce and heavy 4-engined bombers had died in 1936 with General Wever, right
at a time when the US developed their Flying Fortresses.
So you can't measure everything by numbers, and I'm back at the point where a
more capable german leadership like Hitler and Goering could have turned the
tide of several battles. It's just the question how much a game will take this
into account. If the Battle of Britain is designed after the british viewpoint
of things, ok, then 20 german units will be lost at the cost of maybe 10
british in any case and that's it. But to all my knowledge this is a simplistic
viewpoint and will miss some vital points.
Undoubtedly british fighters saved the day for their country, fought with
tremendous skill and bravery. Undoubtedly british commanders like Dowding and
Park surpassed the strategically inept Göring. But still I am convinced that
this inability to do the strategycally right thing is the last trueth of the
Battle of Britain. And it's the question whether a game aiming at such high
standards shouldn't take this into consideration.
Ok, sorry about this lengthy comment and I have to admit I am not sure whether
this will be read by anyone except Andy and me and maybe it's even turning
people away from this thread. Maybe, I just thought, we should end those very
specific discussions since thei might scare people away and do more harm than
good, but I had to stand to my viewpoint. I resent it's far off, quite to the
opposite.
Date: Wed Jun 9 21:03:35 2004
Sender: Phil Bradley
I read it.. I thought about jumping into the conversation earlier but feel
that it will require much energy.
Date: Wed Jun 9 22:45:33 2004
Sender: Andy Dolphin
Stephen: Roosevelt certainly campaigned on the "I won't send your sons to
Europe" platform in 1940. But his actions throughout 1941 showed an increased
willingness to send US troops into harm's way. By November 1941, the US Navy
was effectively at war against Germany, even if the army and air force weren't.
The oil embargo on Japan forced Japan to decide between war and pulling out of
China, the latter going against every grain of Japanese culture of the day.
(That aspect of Japan has to be hardwired into the game; the fact is that there
was no way under any circumstance that they would withdraw from China, let
alone Manchuria. To allow them to do so would be 'fantasy' realms again.)
The reason Pearl Harbor wasn't a 'pivotal' event in Europe was that the US
economy began mobilizing when war broke out. So as long as the US is at war by
mid-1942 (in time for the Torch landings), when they enter the war isn't a
totally earthshattering issue. Furthermore, had Japan waited to attack the US
until the ships built by the "two ocean navy" act were finished, it would have
been annihilated. The Japanese strategy was as sound as possible under the
circumstances -- strike before the US navy was built up, buy yourself some time
by cripping the US as much as possible, and make them wage a long, bloody
campaign.
Nathan: available manpower would tilt the scales even further in America's
favor if it took on Germany. As for getting troops and equipment to Europe, I
don't think it would have been a crippling problem.
Klaus: I was replying to your comment that the Germans came closer to winning
than English histories admit. Given that English histories readily admit that
the RAF was against the ropes, your statement would only have been true had
Germany actually won the Battle of Britain, which it didn't. But since you
have made this a major topic...
I don't see that the production numbers are misleading. Britain was losing
fewer aircraft than Germany and was producing more. It's not hard to see that
the German air force was losing strength at a greater rate than the British.
But fine, I'll get the actual fighter strengths (serviceable aircraft), listing
aircraft in squadrons and total available aircraft (including reserve):
7/19 642 1064
7/26 655 1105
8/02 675 1092
8/09 687 1154
8/16 653 1105
8/23 733 1060
8/30 717 976
9/06 700 1012
9/13 678 951
9/20 711 975
9/27 684 990
I think it's plain enough that the 'phase II' you describe didn't do much of
anything, as the number of serviceable British fighters was lowered by a mere
48 during those two weeks. (This was because of production, as the British did
lose a lot of planes.)
One other point; British squadrons contained 16 aircraft, not 26. So the
fact that they had 16 planes in them was not a sign that they were under
strength.
But more significantly, you neglect the purpose of the air raids. The point
was to eliminate the RAF as a fighting force by mid-September, which was the
very latest that an invasion could be started before winter weather made it
impossible until spring. When it became clear that this goal would not be
achieved (even you note that the British had 3 weeks of reserve aircraft in
early September), the Germans wisely decided that achieving air superiority
just for fun wouldn't be very useful, and instead went for the strategic
bombing campaign.
Date: Thu Jun 10 04:50:57 2004
Sender: Stephen Thompson
Andy, fair enough point about the Japanese. But for the Pearl Harbor question,
I will come back to my point. If Pearl Harbor is not a mandatory event, what
will bring the US into the war?
Sure, between things like Lend-Lease, having the navy accompany our merchant
vessels, and having US pilots flying in the RAF, the US was pretty much in the
war though Roosevelt was publicly opposed to it. But it doesn't change the
fact that EVERYTHING changed on December 8, 1941.
If Pearl Harbor is not necessary for initiating US involvement, then what is to
stop the US from joining the fray on 9/1/39 with France and Britain? What
keeps the US from doing a similar raid on Japan's fleet first?
And if Pearl Harbor is necessary, what will keep the Pacific fleet in port in
December 41?
Date: Thu Jun 10 23:02:24 2004
Sender: Andy Dolphin
There will be a simulation of the public sentiment for isolationism that allows
the US to take increasingly aggressive actions as time goes on.
Date: Sat Jun 12 15:36:41 2004
Sender: David Rogers
Maybe we should all watch the History channel for a couple of weeks before play
begins ...
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